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When Britain leaves the European Union on 29 March 2019 it will also leave 
the common agricultural policy (‘CAP’) and the common fisheries policy, both 
of which have had a profound impact upon our natural environment over the 
past fifty years. The negative impacts of the CAP are well documented.2 
Michael Gove signalled in 2017 an intention to use the freedom of action 
offered by Brexit to fundamentally reshape public support for agriculture, and 
to deliver a ‘greener’ vision for agriculture policy:  
 
‘We now have an historic opportunity to review our policies on 
agriculture, on land use, on biodiversity on woodlands, on marine 
conservation….we need to take the opportunity that being outside the 
common agricultural policy will give us to reward environmentally 
responsible land use.…..The Common Agricultural Policy rewards 
size of land-holding ahead of good environmental practice, and all too 
often puts resources in the hands of the already wealthy rather than 
into the common good of our shared natural environment. It also 
encourages patterns of land use which are wasteful of natural 
resources and often intrinsically poor value rather than encouraging 
imaginative and environmentally enriching alternatives’.3  
 
The alternative vision started to take shape in the DEFRA consultation, and 
the policy statement that followed in September 2018: Health and Harmony: 
the future for food, farming and the environment in a Green Brexit.4 The key 
policy driver in future would be the reshaping of agricultural support around 
                                                        
1 Professor of Law, Newcastle University. I am grateful to Wyn Grant, Mark Reed and the 
other members of the Farmer-Scientist Network of the Yorkshire Agriculture Society working 
group on Brexit for feedback on the suggestions made in this paper. The views expressed 
here are those of the author alone. The working group’s submission to the House of 
Commons Defra select committee on the Agriculture Bill is available at: 
http://yas.co.uk/uploads/files/Defra_committee.pdf  
2 For the decline in farmland bird populations see for example: Wild Bird Populations in 
England 1970 to 2017 (Defra, 2018) available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/754532/England_Wild_Birds_1970-2017_FINAL__002_.pdf (las accessed 5 December 
2018). 
3‘The Unfrozen Moment – Delivering a Green Brexit’, speech by Michael Gove MP, Secretary 
of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (21 July 2017);  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-unfrozen-moment-delivering-a-green-brexit 
(accessed 22 November 2018) 
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-for-food-farming-and-the-
environment-policy-statement-2018/health-and-harmony-the-future-for-food-farming-and-the-
environment-in-a-green-brexit-policy-statement (accessed 22 November 2018) 
the principle of ‘public money for public goods’. The implications of this 
change in direction are far reaching and multi-faceted. It is also closely 
connected and complementary to the policies outlined in the 25-year 
Environment Plan published by HM government earlier in 2018.5 Before we 
consider these in more detail, it will be necessary to first consider the way in 
which public support for agriculture is currently organised within the CAP.  
 
Farm Support under the CAP 
 
Although public financial support for the agriculture sector has declined in 
relative terms, spending on the CAP in the UK still stands at over £3 Billion 
annually. Direct payments to farmers are delivered separately under the two 
‘Pillars’ of the CAP. Pillar 1 channels direct payments to farmers within the 
‘basic payment scheme’, while Pillar 2 funds rural development measures, 
including the financing of the agri-environment schemes (‘AES’) under the 
England Rural Development Plan, and the rural development plans for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland e.g. Countryside Stewardship in 
England and Glastir in Wales.  Expenditure under Pillar 1 is fully financed 
from the EU budget, whereas expenditure under Pillar 2 is, in almost all 
cases, dependent upon co-financing by Member States.  In 2017 direct 
payments under Pillar 1 in the UK actually rose by 2.4% to £2.719 billion; 
payments under Pillar 2 for agri-environment measures fell slightly to £423 
million.6  In total, in 2017 £3.25 billion was paid to UK farmers and landowners 
under the various CAP support arrangements.7   
 
The policy design of CAP support is itself contentious. Critics argue that is 
essentially a public subsidy for the private production of a private good – food, 
for which the public pays twice (as tax payers and again as food purchasers).8 
And because Pillar 1 payments are paid on a per hectare basis, the majority 
of public financial support goes to a minority of large landowners: it is 
estimated that half of direct aid beneficiaries receive less than 1250 Euros a 
year, while 2% of beneficiaries each receive more than 50,000 Euros annually 
- over 30% of the total direct payments envelope.9 Its environmental impacts 
have also been well rehearsed. Two recent French studies have, for example, 
highlighted the loss of 30% of French farmland bird populations over the last 
                                                        
5 A Green Future: Our 25-year Plan to Improve the Environment (HM Government, 2018) 
available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications. 
6 Agriculture in the United Kingdom (Defra, 2018) Table 10.1. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/741062/AUK-2017-18sep18.pdf 
7 Ibid Table 10.2. 
8 See I.J. Bateman and B. Balmford, ‘Public Funding for public goods: A Post-Brexit 
perspective on principles for agricultural policy’ (2018) 79 Land Use Policy 293 -300, 294 
9 See Alan Matthews, (2018) CAP Reform.eu: ‘More on Capping Direct payments’, available 
at: http://capreform.eu/more-on-capping-direct-payments-2/ (accessed 29 November 2018). 
And see I.J. Bateman and B. Balmford, ibid. Figure 1 at 294. 
15years, mainly as a result of increased pesticide use.10 Farmland bird 
populations in the UK have also seen substantial declines, with spectacular 
collapses in the breeding populations of some iconic bird species, such as 
corn bunting.11 
 
A recent study by the Wildlife Trusts, RSPB and the National Trust estimated 
that the financial needs for environmental land management post-Brexit would 
require an annual investment of at least £2.3 billion p.a.12 This means, in 
effect, that when we leave the CAP, the funds currently disbursed under Pillar 
2 of CAP will need to be replaced by a much larger environmental ‘envelope’ - 
into which much of the ‘saving’ from the cessation of Pillar 1 payments will 
need to be put if post-Brexit agricultural policy is to deliver the environmental 
benefits that Brexit could offer.  
 
If we are to develop an environmental policy tailored to the specific needs of 
the British countryside, free from the constraints of the CAP, this will require 
both vision and innovation in developing new and ambitious approaches to 
environmental land management. It will also be expensive. But Brexit does 
give us the opportunity to develop a new approach to the ‘farmed’ 
environment, tailored to the specific needs of the wildlife and habitats found in 
the British countryside, and to start to remedy some of the environmental 
harm cause by the intensive farming practices formerly encouraged by the 
CAP. The key questions are: how should a new environmental land 
management programme be designed, and how should it be targeted? And, 
of course, how and to what extent will it be resourced?   
 
 
The Agriculture Bill  
 
                                                        
10 See “Catastrophe as France’s bird population collapses due to pesticides”, at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/catastrophe-as-frances-bird-population-
collapses-due-to-pesticides (accessed 29 November 2018). 
11 Official statistics point, for example, to a 56% decline in farmland bird populations since 
1970: see Wild Bird Populations in England 1970 to 2017 (Defra, 2018) available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/754532/England_Wild_Birds_1970-2017_FINAL__002_.pdf (las accessed 5 December 
2018)..  
12 Rayment, M. (2017) Assessing the Costs of Environmental Land management in the UK - 
final report. A Report for the RSPB, the National Trust and the Wildlife Trusts. See Table 5.9 
at page 31. For the breakdown of annual costs for the restoration of priority habitats, 
boundary features, historic features arable and grassland management see Tables 5.1 – 5.7. 
Available at: 
https://www.wildlifetrusts.org/sites/default/files/2018-
03/RSPB%2C%20The%20National%20Trust%20and%20The%20Wildlife%20Trusts%20-
%20Assessing%20the%20costs%20of%20environmental%20land%20management%20in%2
0the%20UK.%20Final%20report..pdf (last accessed 29 November 2018) 
The most important change posited by the Health and Harmony policy 
statement is the proposal to base future agricultural support on the principle of 
‘public money for public goods’ – with the protection and enhancement of the 
environment being considered ‘the pre-eminent public good’.13 The policy 
statement suggested that a new environmental land management scheme will 
be developed to deliver the outcomes of the 25 Year Environment Plan and 
the Clean Growth Strategy.14 Freed from the constraints of working within the 
legal framework of the CAP, this will be able to develop innovative 
approaches to environmental stewardship.   
 
The first step in this direction came with the introduction of the Agriculture Bill 
into the House of Commons in September 2018. Important questions remain 
unanswered, however. There is no definition of ‘public goods’ in the Bill itself – 
what will the new approach encompass? How will support for environmental 
land management be paid for? How will the use of public money for 
environmental protection be evaluated (on a payment by results basis for 
example?)? And what legal instruments will be needed to underpin new and 
innovative ways of managing the natural environment? None of these ‘big’ 
questions are addressed in the Agriculture Bill. This will be an enabling Act, 
giving DEFRA wide administrative powers to oversee and administer grant 
schemes and the monitoring and management of public support to farmers, 
landowners and others. But it lacks clarity on a range of key issues, including 
the balance that will be sought between promoting food production and 
environmental protection, and how the ‘pubic goods’ to be provided by the 
new policy will be prioritised for financial support.15 It also establishes an 
‘agricultural transition period’ for England, which will run for seven years 
starting with 2021, and during which the Secretary of State will have power to 
make regulations modifying aspects of the EU direct payments and rural 
development regimes insofar as their application continues.16 Whether the 
vision becomes a reality will depend upon the design and delivery of the new 
land management scheme – which remains a work in progress. 
 
If we consider the prospects for future environmental land management, the 
most important new power in the Bill17  is one enabling DEFRA to give 
financial assistance for managing land or water: ‘in a way that protects or 
improves the environment’, cultural or natural heritage; that supports public 
                                                        
13 Health and Harmony op.cit at page 32. 
14 Health and Harmony op.cit. at page 36. 
15 The lack of clarity in the Agriculture Bill on key issues such as these has been criticized by 
the House of Commons Environment Food and Rural Environment Committee: see Scrutiny 
of the Agriculture Bill, 10th Report of the Session 2017-19, esp. paras 23 and 24. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvfru/1591/1591.pdf (last 
accessed 6th December 2018). 
16 See Clauses 6 -11 Agriculture Bill 2018. 
17 See Clause 1 (1) Agriculture Bill 2018 
access to the countryside; supports mitigation or adaptation to climate 
change; that prevents, reduces or protects from environmental hazards; that 
protects or improves the health of livestock; and/or that protects or improves 
the health of plants. This is a wide-ranging empowerment clause; one that 
would facilitate the future provision of financial support not only for agri-
environmental schemes that pay farmers for land management to protect and 
recreate sensitive habitats and landscapes, but also for measures to promote 
(for example) the creation and management of ‘green space’ for open pubic 
access, climate change focussed actions, and measures to promote animal 
welfare. The potential range of recipients under the new financial subvention 
power is not limited to farmers. It can be used to make payments for 
environmental services provided by a wide range of actors – including for 
example NGOs, landowners, and those (for example the water utilities) 
purchasing ecosystem services from land managers. This represents a 
change from the previous powers that applied under CAP, where payment 
was restricted to ‘active farmers’, and the enabling legislation set out a 
complex legal definition to establish a claimant’s qualification to receive 
payment.18 
 
The breadth of the enabling powers in the Bill is important. In particular, it will 
facilitate the provision of wider public financial support for multi partner 
arrangements to provide ecosystem services. Consider for example the 
provision of ‘slow clean water’ – an important ecosystem benefit that can be 
delivered through the careful management of large upland areas within a 
water catchment. Sympathetic land management would be of considerable 
value to a water utility taking water from the catchment for drinking water 
supply; it could reduce nitrate and fertiliser levels in the water entering its 
water treatment works and reduce rates of flow in rivers and streams feeding 
water supply works, both of which would reduce the utility’s operating costs 
when providing potable water for public supply. The wide powers in the Bill 
could be used to give financial support for multi-party agreements between 
farmers, landowners, water companies, sporting groups (for example grouse 
moor managers) and others with an interest in the use of upland areas within 
the water catchment. This is a significant shift in emphasis and direction for 
environmental land management schemes and their public funding model. 
This type of arrangement does not currently map neatly onto the legal 
arrangements for public support under Pillar 2 of the CAP, where payments 
are limited to an ‘active farmer’. Any subsidy paid to farmers for land 
management in a water catchment are currently paid directly to them under 
agri-environment schemes, such as Countryside Stewardship, funded through 
the England Rural Development Plan by taxation and co-financing from the 
                                                        
18 See Art. 9 Regulation (EU) 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013 OJ L347/608 (20.12.2013) 
EU.19 There is no provision for funding non-farmer actors (such as the utilities 
in the example given above) in this funding model.        
 
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) 
 
The Health and Harmony policy proposals could signal a shift to modelling 
future agricultural support on payment for the ecosystem services supplied by 
land managers.20 The ecosystem services provided by agricultural land 
management are wide ranging – for example, managing sensitive habitats for 
biodiversity, providing ‘slow clean water’ in water catchments (water 
regulation), managing upland moors for carbon capture and retention (climate 
regulation), or providing open public access to land for recreational use 
(cultural ecosystem services). Many of these services are currently funded 
through Pillar 2 payments made to land managers under area-based 
management agreements entered into under AES such as Higher-Level 
Stewardship and Countryside Stewardship. There is no direct link in area-
based payments, however, between a ‘seller’ of ecosystem services and a 
‘buyer’ or ‘user’ of such services.  
 
A move to PES as the basis for future agricultural support would require us to 
put a value (‘price’) on ecosystem services, which could then be purchased by 
end users – and these could include private actors (for example the water 
utilities) as well as the public at large. It would, in other words, be premised on 
linking land managers as ‘suppliers’ of the service with end-users or 
purchasers.21 This would enable us to introduce private purchase by third 
parties into the equation, as well as funding some ecosystem services of 
wider societal benefit through ‘purchase’ at public expense. The latter might 
include the protection of sensitive natural habitats or landscapes and 
providing new opportunities for public access to privately owned land (which 
will also provide health benefits though pubic access to ‘green space’). A well-
designed PES scheme could, therefore, have a blended mixture of private 
and public funding delivering multiple benefits.22 There are, however, 
                                                        
19 The Catchment Sensitive Farming scheme, for example, offers a partnership approach 
between Defra, the Environment Agency, Natural England and farmers in high priority 
catchment areas. The scheme is underpinned by financial support delivered through the 
Countryside Stewardship AES. See further: 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/catchment-sensitive-farming-reduce-agricultural-water-pollution 
20 See Health and Harmony op.cit at page 37. 
21 See A.P.Hejnowicz and S.E Hartley (2018) New Directions A Pubic Goods Approach to 
Agricultural Policy Post-Brexit.  Esp. Para 6.3 ff.. Available at: 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/03/Public_Goods_Report_Final.pdf (last accessed 29 
November 2018). 
22 See generally Colin T Reid and Walters Nsoh, The Privatisation of Biodiversity 
(Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar, 2016), Chapter 3. 
challenges to replacing direct, area-based payments with PES schemes that 
link public money to the provision of public goods.  
 
One criticism of the current system based no area-based payments is the 
uncertainty of the future benefit they deliver – how can we justify payment if a 
public ‘good’ has not actually been delivered in return for payment? Another 
problem associated with the current approach, which is based on 
management agreements as the legal medium for ‘wrapping’ subsidy 
payments in appropriate land management obligations,23 is that at the end of 
the contract the property rights exchanged in the agreement will revert to the 
landowner. This means that any environmental benefit developed at public 
expense during the agreement is not ‘locked in’ or preserved – the land 
manager is free to manage the land in future as s/he wishes, even if this 
destroys or diminishes the environmental improvements previously 
‘purchased’ at cost under the agreement.24  At first sight payment by results 
might be a better option for delivering PES. But while this may appear to be a 
cost-effective way of delivering value for money for taxpayers, directly linking 
payments to outcomes ("payment by results”) can be problematic. For 
example, schemes are costly to monitor, farmers may be exposed to 
unnecessary risk if a natural disaster prevents them from meeting agreed 
outcome, or well-organised NGOs and large landowners could out-compete 
small individual farmers when competing for payments to deliver a public 
good.25 It does not seem unreasonable for the risk to be shared between the 
farmer and the taxpayer if a PES scheme is to incentivise farmers and 
landowners to participate.26 
 
Research funded by the Valuing Nature Programme, drawing on experience 
in the Welsh Rural Development Programme, has proposed three key 
changes to agricultural payments that could overcome some of the problems 
inherent in developing PES schemes. Firstly, we should pay for the 
ecosystem services that are valued most by society based on economics 
research into public preferences for different services in different parts of the 
UK. Secondly, payments should be targeted to locations where ecosystem 
services can most efficiently be provided, based on evidence from land use 
modelling, using random sampling within land classes to validate model 
                                                        
23 See Christopher Rodgers, The Law of Nature Conservation; Property Environment and the 
Limits of Law (Oxford, OUP, 2013) Chapter 4 pp.112-122.  
24 C.P.Rodgers,  “Property Rights, Land Use and the Rural Environment: A Case for Reform” 
(2009) 26S Land Use Policy 134-141. 
25 See Reed, M.S., Moxey, A., Prager, K., Hanley, N., Skates, J., Evans, C., Glenk, K., 
Scarpa, R., Thompson, K. et al. (2014) Improving the link between payments and the 
provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes in UK peatlands. Ecosystem 
Services 9: 44-53. 
26 I.J. Bateman and B. Balmford, ‘Public Funding for public goods: A Post-Brexit perspective 
on principles for agricultural policy’ (2018) 79 Land Use Policy 293 -300, 296. 
outputs in place of more widespread farm inspections. Finally, we should 
provide incentives for cross-boundary collaboration over the provision of 
ecosystem services that need to be managed at catchment or wider spatial 
scales. Land managers could, for example, be given a menu of environmental 
benefits to choose from, with the menu differing between areas, depending on 
the public preferences,27 and which benefits can most cost-effectively be 
provided in any given location. Existing process-based models using 
combined high-resolution remote sensing imagery can identify locations 
where there are opportunities to provide key benefits in the most cost-
effective way.28 In this way, spending is prioritized (by increasing scheme 
points available) to the locations that can most easily provide the benefits that 
society wants, and land managers in those locations are paid for the work 
they do on a stable, ongoing basis. It is important to note that there would be 
both winners and losers if those managing certain areas are paid more or 
less, based on the different levels of benefits they are able to provide society.  
 
An alternative option would supplement public funding for the provision of 
environmental benefits with private funding via PES Services schemes; 
successful examples here include the Woodland Carbon Code29 and the 
Peatland Code.30 Place-based schemes have the potential to integrate 
payments for multiple services and habitats to provide payments at higher 
levels over longer periods than are currently available for similar work under 
the EU funding.31 Landscape Enterprise Networks (LENs) were highlighted in 
the 25 year environment plan as an example of this approach, integrating 
funding from private beneficiaries to deliver benefits for the environment, 
farmers and businesses.32 The LENs approach is currently being researched 
in the Global Food Security programme’s Resilient Dairy Landscapes project, 
which is working with the dairy industry and government to develop new 
                                                        
27 Christie, M., Rayment, M., 2012. An economic assessment of the ecosystem service 
benefits derived from the SSSI biodiversity conservation policy in England and Wales. 
Ecosystem Services 1, 70–84; Christie, M., Hyde, T., Cooper, R., Fazey, I., Dennis, P., 
Warren, C.S., Hanley, N., 2011. Economic valuation of the Benefits of Ecosystem Services 
delivered by the UK Biodiversity Action Plan. Defra, London. 
28 Emmett B.E. and the GMEP team (2017) Glastir Monitoring & Evaluation Programme. Final 
Report to Welsh Government - Executive Summary (Contract reference: C147/2010/11). 
NERC/Centre for Ecology & Hydrology (CEH Projects: NEC04780/NEC05371/NEC05782); 
Reed, M.S., Moxey, A., Prager, K., Hanley, N., Skates, J., Evans, C., Glenk, K., Scarpa, R., 
Thompson, K. et al. (2014) Improving the link between payments and the provision of 
ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes in UK peatlands. Ecosystem Services 9: 
44-53. 
29 See: https://www.forestry.gov.uk/carboncode 
30 See: http://www.iucn-uk-peatlandprogramme.org/peatland-code 
31 Reed MS, Allen K, Dougill AJ, Evans, K, Stead SM, Stringer LC, Twyman C, Dunn H, Smith 
C, Rowecroft P, Smith S, Atlee AC, Scott AS, Smyth MA, Kenter J, Whittingham MJ (2017) A 
Place-Based Approach to Payments for Ecosystem Services. Global Environmental Change 
43: 92-106. 
32 A Green Future: Our 25-year Plan to Improve the Environment (HM Government, 2018) at 
page 140 
pricing models based on payments for ecosystem services, thereby potentially 
generating additional income for farmers while enhancing food security.33 
 
Other models have been suggested, including the Natural Infrastructure 
Scheme (NIS) proposed by the National Trust and Green Alliance.34 This 
would bring together public and private actors in a PES based framework to 
develop environmentally beneficial land management. The National 
Infrastructure Scheme explores options for setting the price for ecosystem 
services on the basis of the avoided cost delivered to the ‘purchaser’. The 
model is a variation on the PES ‘payment range’ model that has been 
suggested as a best practice option by government.35 It would cover net 
profits foregone by the provider (e.g. a farmer) in changing his/her land 
management so as to provide the service, and the upper ceiling would be 
variable, and represent the external benefits of the ecosystem provided. In the 
case of wetlands management, for example, this could be flood risk 
management, water quality management or habitat protection, as the case 
may be. Using an ‘avoided cost’ basis for the payment calculation would allow 
PES to capture the costs saving to (for example) a water utility of ‘slow clean 
water’ provided through changes in catchment land management by farmers, 
in agreement with the ‘purchaser’ utility. The scheme would provide a means 
to bring groups of land managers together to sell environmental services to 
groups of beneficiaries, facilitated by a new area-based market in avoided 
costs.36 
 
 
Creating a Market for Ecosystem Services: Legal Issues 
 
Implementing an ambitious programme involving any, or a combination, of the 
above would require the development of a new legal model to underpin the 
creation of a new market for the provision of ecosystem services. This will 
need to be sufficiently flexible and robust to accommodate four objectives: (i) 
the combination of public and (ii) private funding inputs, combined with (iii) 
long term horizons for environmental planning by landscape managers, and 
also (iv) provide a legal basis for collaborative implementation at a landscape 
scale.  
                                                        
33 See Resilient Dairy Landscapes project information. Available at: 
 https://www.resilientdairylandscapes.com (last accessed 30th November 2018). 
34 New Markets for Land and Nature: how natural infrastructure schemes could pay for a 
better environment, by A. Francis, S.A. Brown, W.A. Tipper and N. Wheeler (Green Alliance 
2016), ISBN 978-1-909980-74-7 
35 Defra 2013, Payments for Ecosystem Services: A Best Practice Guide. Available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/200920/pb13932-pes-bestpractice-20130522.pdf (last accessed 30 November 2018) .  
36 See New Markets for Land and Nature: how natural infrastructure schemes could pay for a 
better environment ibid. at 26ff. 
 (a) A Stable Property Rights Framework 
 
Long term planning and implementation requires a stable long-term tenure 
structure within which the ecosystem ‘provider’ can develop land management 
systems to deliver the public goods incentivised by the chosen scheme model 
- whether it be the publicly funded provision of ecosystem services using one 
of the models above, or the provision of environmental benefits with mixed or 
private funding, such as the National Infrastructure Scheme or the Peatlands 
Code.  
 
Viewed through the lens of agricultural economics, schemes based on PES 
create new property rights in ecosystem service provision designed to 
internalise environmental costs. The allocation of these new rights depends, 
of course, on the pre-existing distribution of property rights and the 
institutional framework on which those rights rest.37 It is important that public 
agencies can direct payments to the right ‘providers’, and if there is a lack of 
clarity in the allocation of property rights – of who can access and manage the 
land which is to me managed so as to deliver the ecosystem services in 
question – then this may provide the conditions for elites to appropriate 
traditional access rights.38 The tenurial basis by which ecosystem providers 
hold land is therefore of direct relevance to the development of robust PES 
schemes in practice.  
 
In England and Wales, a large proportion of agricultural land will be held by 
land managers under one of two forms of tenancy structure: either as an 
agricultural holding39 or a farm business tenancy (‘FBT’).40 Agricultural 
Holdings enjoy extensive security, giving the farm tenant lifetime security of 
tenure with (in some cases) two generation succession rights. A substantial 
area of land is still held under this category of full agricultural tenancy - in 
2016, 1,407,000 hectares of farmland in England was held as agricultural 
holdings.41 In England and Wales as a whole this approximates to 17% of the 
total area of farmed land.42 In contrast, an FBT is a more flexible form of land 
tenure, but offers little security of tenure beyond the contractually agreed 
                                                        
37 S. Lockie, ‘Market Instruments, Ecosystem Services and Property Rights’ (2013) 31 Land 
Use Policy 90-98. 
38 S.Lockie, ‘Market Instruments, Ecosystem Services and Property Rights’, ibid.   
39 These are governed by the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, and with some exceptions will 
have been created before 1sst September 1995. 
40 Created on or after 1st September 1995 and governed by the Agricultural Tenancies Act 
1995. 
41 See Table 2 in the Farm Rents Survey 2016/17 – England (2018, Defra) . Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/695370/fbs-farmrents2016-29mar18.pdf 
42 Scammell, Densham and Williams, Law of Agricultural Holdings (2018, LexisNexis, 10th 
ed.) at 1.92. 
period of the tenancy.43 Most FBTs are of short duration, although some 
institutional landowners use longer term FBTs e.g. for a fixed period of ten 
years. In 2016 1,193,000 hectares of land was held under FBTs.44 
 
The use of FBTs will often be inappropriate to meet the needs of a PES 
scheme, as they create an insecure form of property right in the ‘provider’. 
Most FBTs are currently short term, and of approximately 4 years duration.45 
Conversely, land that is held under an ‘old style’ Agricultural Holdings Act 
1986 tenancy will give the producer long term security of tenure, but at the 
same time the permitted purposes to which land can be put will usually be 
limited to agricultural production. The Tenant Farmers Association has 
stressed the impact of short-term agreements on farmers’ ability to participate 
in current agri-environment schemes, and on their impact on under-
investment.46 If we are to develop an ambitious new policy grounded in PES, 
and that builds on the successes of current agri-environment schemes, then 
this issue needs to be addressed.   
 
The creation of a stable property rights basis for a new PES scheme can be 
addressed in one of two ways: either by: 
 
(i) the introduction of a new type of tenancy structure for use where a 
long-term management scheme for providing public goods is to be 
introduced (for example an ‘environmental land tenancy’ of, say, 20 
years fixed duration). This might have periodic break clauses 
allowing for review of the performance of targets for the provision of 
public goods – accommodating both a ‘results’-based approach 
and/or a management prescription-driven approach. Or 
(ii) the retention of current tenancy structures with the use of 
contractually binding arrangements between landowner and tenant 
providing for a review of performance at periodic breaks – and with 
a commitment to renew or extend tenure upon the satisfactory 
delivery of public goods (again this could be measured either by 
delivery of land management obligations or by results). In the case 
of 1986 Act tenancies, the Tenancy Reform Industry Group has 
recently recommended the introduction of a facility to refer the 
                                                        
43 See Christopher Rodgers, Agricultural Law (2016 Bloomsbury, 4th ed.) Chapters 3 and 4. 
44 See Table 6 in the Farm Rents Survey 2016/17 – England (2018, Defra) . Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/695370/fbs-farmrents2016-29mar18.pdf 
45 The annual Agricultural Land Occupation Survey 2017, conducted by the Central 
Association of Agricultural Valuers (CAAV), showed a decrease in the average length of all 
FBTs from 4.5 years in 2016 to under 4 years in 2017: see 
https://www.farminguk.com/News/Short-term-nature-of-agricultural-tenancies-has-h-
_49833.html 
46 http://www.tfa.org.uk/media-release-mr18-15-government-must-not-leave-tenant-farming-
as-the-cinderella-sector/ 
variation of the terms of the tenancy to arbitration where an 
‘environmental advantage’ is to be pursued.47  This could, if 
implemented, prove useful to underpin the implementation of long-
term management for ecosystem services provision. A similar 
arrangement could be considered where land is held under a long-
term Farm Business Tenancy.  
 
 
(b) Legal Models for Multi-party Environmental Agreements 
 
The implementation of landscape level management will require the use of 
collaborative arrangements that will need to be captured in a legal form that is 
both flexible enough to allow for changed targets and land management 
prescriptions, but also robust in making provision for the monitoring (and if 
necessary legal enforcement) of management prescriptions. AES such as 
Higher-level Stewardship and Countryside Stewardship are currently 
implemented using a contractual model – management agreements with 
public bodies (e.g. Natural England) typically for 10 years in duration with 
publicly funded payments for agreed management prescriptions.  
 
This model suffers drawbacks as a mechanism for landscape level 
management of ecosystems: it is time-limited and (as noted above) it does not 
guarantee the retention of public goods that have been ‘purchased’ during the 
term of the agreement. And it operates at the level of the farm or producer, 
not at a landscape level. Landscape Enterprise Networks (‘LENS’) offer a 
wider frame of reference to develop landscape level environmental 
management - but implementing a programme of this kind will require a new 
legal framework to underpin performance, monitoring and (important in a long-
term arrangement) dispute resolution. Similar challenges will arise from 
initiatives such as the Natural Infrastructure Scheme proposed by the National 
Trust and Green Alliance.48  
 
A new legal model will be required that can engage multiple producers and 
farmers in a collaborative agreement structure which delivers landscape level 
benefits. Options to clothe such an arrangement with legal enforceability 
might include the following: 
 
                                                        
47 Tenancy Reform Industry Group, Working Group on the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, 
Final Report 8th October 2017 at page 14.  The TRIG report suggests the introduction of a 
new section 14A to the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. See: 
http://www.tfa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/TRIG-AHA-Working-Group-Final-
Report.pdf 
48 New Markets for Land and Nature: how natural infrastructure schemes could pay for a 
better environment, above note 30. 
(i) The Use of Conservation Covenants. These have been little used in 
England and Wales, where the National Trust is currently the only 
body with formal covenanting power.49 However, the Law 
Commission has recommended the establishment of a new, and 
much wider, statutory scheme for conservation covenants in 
England and Wales, with ‘core conditions’ that covenants should 
meet.50 The covenant would have to be agreed by two parties, one 
of whom would be a landowner51 and the other a ‘beneficiary’  
holding the covenant on behalf of the public – this would be a 
‘responsible body’ with responsibility for monitoring and enforcing 
the obligations in the covenant.52 There would be no need for the 
beneficiary to hold adjoining land that could benefit from the 
covenant, and it could be of either a positive or restrictive nature. 
Finally, the covenant would bind the land in the hands of 
successors of the original covenanting parties, if the land were 
subsequently sold or transferred. The covenant would, in other 
words, be ‘perpetual’ in effect and bind the land indefinitely.  
Perpetual effect is important for delivering the conservation goals to 
be pursued by a covenant - long term conservation management of 
the land which, once dedicated, cannot be released when the land 
passes into the hands of successors or new owners.  This could be 
a model for an arrangement binding land in a collaborative 
landscape scale scheme indefinitely, with multiple 
landowners/tenants/ and beneficiaries of each covenant. The 
introduction of legislation to facilitate the wider use of conservation 
covenants was highlighted in the 25-year environment plan.53 If 
conservation covenants are to capture the provision of ecosystem 
services, however, then the range of possible beneficiaries would 
need to be wider than that proposed under the Law Commission’s 
proposed scheme e.g. the water utilities may wish to enter into a 
covenant where land management for ‘clean slow water’ is to be 
established in a water catchment.  
(ii) Management agreements may offer a more flexible legal 
mechanism for capturing ecosystem services provision. Natural 
England has wide power under the Natural Environment and Rural 
Communities Act 2006 to enter into an agreement ‘with any person 
                                                        
49 see National Trust Act 1937, s 8. 
50 Law Commission Conservation Covenants (Law Comm.349, 2014) at paras 2.82 et seq. 
51 That is, someone with a freehold interest in the land burdened with the covenant, or 
someone with a lease of at least 7 years duration (see para 2.82 ibid). 
52 This is a similar model to that in Scotland, where only designated conservation bodies can 
hold the benefit of a conservation covenant: Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, 38. 
53 A Green Future: Our 25-year Plan to Improve the Environment (HM Government, 2018), at 
p.62.  available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications 
who has an interest in land about the management of that land’.54 
This power is not limited to securing management in SSSIs or other 
protected areas55 and could be used to underpin an arrangement 
for the provision of ecosystem services. It could be used to provide 
long term (or even perpetual) obligations to provide public goods, 
but greater flexibility in the legal enabling power to enter 
agreements would be required if this was to be achieved. Nothing in 
the 2006 Act prevents the power being used to create a perpetual 
agreement. It is currently used mainly to enter into short term 
agreements with periodic payments by Natural England for 
environmental management. Its use to create long term or 
perpetual obligations for environmental management would require 
substantially increased resourcing e.g. for the payment by Natural 
England of a lump sum payment on conclusion of the agreement. If 
private finance were to be provided in an agreement for the 
provision of ecosystem services by land managers, it will also be 
necessary to widen the scope of the statutory contracting power to 
facilitate the inclusion of all potential participants in a PES 
arrangement – the statutory contracting power is currently limited to 
Natural England and those with a legal interest in the land over 
which the agreement is taken. And a widened management 
agreement power would also need to ensure that agreements bind 
any successors of both the land managers providing the service, 
and also any recipients of ecosystem services who are paying for 
that service under the terms of the PES agreement e.g. a utility 
company paying for land management in a water catchment. The 
2006 Act currently provides that a management agreement is 
‘binding on persons deriving title under or from the persons with 
whom Natural England makes the agreement’. 56 The term ‘deriving 
title’ may be problematic in some circumstances, A new power 
should make it clear that an agreement will be binding on all 
successors of the contracting parties, whether deriving legal title to 
the land or a property interest in it or not.       
 
Conclusion 
 
Moving to a system for managing the natural environment using a PES 
approach to long term land management offers many exciting opportunities 
and potential benefits. If it is to be built on solid legal foundations, however, 
                                                        
54 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s.7. 
55 Cf. other management agreement powers enjoyed by the statutory conservation bodies, 
which are so limited e.g. those under Countryside Act 1968, s. 15 (SSSIs) and Conservation 
of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017, reg. 20 (European sites). 
56 See 2006 Act, s. 7 (3) (a) 
serious consideration of the issues identified above will be needed. Delivering 
‘long term sustainable management’ of the kind posited in the Health and 
Harmony policy statement will require a review of the arrangements for land 
tenure if land managers delivering public goods are to be the beneficiaries of 
the new approach. The use of short-term farm business tenancies, for 
example, may be an inappropriate tenurial mechanism to implement long term 
planning for improved biodiversity and for the provision of many public goods. 
And new policy instruments orientated around PES must avoid making the 
same mistakes that have seen the area-based system for financial support 
under the CAP deliver large sums of public funds to a few large landowners. 
New legal mechanisms will also be needed to underpin an emerging market 
for ecosystem services, and to encourage – and secure – collaborative 
programmes that enable land managers to join with both public bodies and 
ecosystem beneficiaries in delivering public goods at a landscape or water 
catchment scale.  The Agriculture Bill is a tentative first step towards 
developing a radical new approach to environmental land management, a 
process that is likely to prove complex and challenging.    
 
 
 
